Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Control in the Exclusive Economic Zone: a Brief Appraisal of Regulatory Deficits and Accountability Strategies by Mercedes Rosello
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXII (75) - 2016
39
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The conservation of fish stocks in the world’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which collectively 
harbour the vast majority of marine-living resources, is the primary responsibility of coastal States. 
As the effects of failures by coastal States to protect those stocks from the impacts of illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing may extend beyond domestic boundaries, this paper 
questions whether and how coastal States may be made accountable in respect of their regulatory 
deficits. With the proliferation of non-legal conduct rules to guide the regulatory role of States and 
their agencies, non-judicial mechanisms have the potential to foster coastal State stewardship of 
domestic fisheries. Outlining a number of international, transnational and domestic approaches, this 
paper gives consideration to the opportunities and limitations they present in order to strengthen 
coastal State accountability for IUU fishing control deficits.
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Introduction
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a frequently relied-
upon expression in fisheries policy and management circles to refer to 
operations involving the harvesting of marine fish stocks carried out in 
ways that either contravene or circumvent domestic or international 
fisheries conservation and management laws and/or the conservation 
and management rules of certain international organisations. Due to 
its vast environmental and human costs, IUU fishing has gained visibility 
in recent years, making headlines and being featured in international 
security agendas (see Bueger 2015). Much attention has rightly been paid 
to the complex issues raised by IUU fishing in the high seas and associated 
issues of flag State responsibility, yet IUU fishing activities in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and the responsibilities of coastal States to address 
it merit just as much attention. 
As specified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOSC), the EEZ of a coastal State is the area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea  (LOSC: Art. 55), measuring up to 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the territorial sea is measured (ibid.). Fish stocks that do 
not occur outside this area can be accessed by domestic fleets but also in 
some circumstances by the fleets of foreign States. These fleets generally 
carry out their fishing activities constrained by domestic laws and, where 
applicable, by the terms of bilateral access agreements signed between 
the State where the fishing vessel is registered, or flag State, and the 
coastal States, or private agreements signed directly between coastal 
States and vessel owners or operators. Where these fleets act in ways that 
are detrimental to conservation, it can be difficult to determine in practice 
whether and to what extent those activities constitute IUU fishing, who is 
responsible for their conduct and what consequences should follow. 
This article introduces the term IUU fishing and highlights its relevance to 
the activities of fleets operating in the EEZ for non-transboundary stock. 
It also explores the responsibility of the coastal State in respect of these 
operations by reference to a recent advisory opinion by the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Highlighting that the coastal State 
bears the primary, though not exclusive, responsibility for the IUU fishing 
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operations of vessels inside the EEZ, the article argues that opportunities to 
make the coastal State accountable for shortcomings in its conservation 
and management obligations, which include those in respect of IUU 
control, are insufficient at the international level. Yet, although deficient 
and underdeveloped, accountability mechanisms are not completely 
absent, particularly when non-judicial and domestic options are taken 
into consideration.
IUU Fishing: A Complex Issue Empirically and Legally
The first global document to specify the scope of IUU fishing was the 
2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA IUU, or IPOA) (FAO 2001), 
which is a non-binding toolbox for States seeking to combat IUU fishing. 
The IPOA’s description of IUU fishing has now been consolidated in the 
corpus of international law.1 Rather than enabling binary ‘legal versus 
illegal’ assessments of conduct, the description is arguably better suited 
to assisting regulators in addressing fishing practices perceived as being 
included in one or more of the following three categories, as set out in 
paragraph 3 of the IPOA: 
3.1 Illegal fishing refers to activities: 
3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters 
under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of 
that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;
3.1.2 conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that 
are parties to a relevant regional fisheries management 
organization but operate in contravention of the conservation 
and management measures adopted by that organization 
and by which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of 
the applicable international law; or
1 See Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing, (2009), ATNIF 41.
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3.1.3 in violation of national laws or international obligations, 
including those undertaken by cooperating States to a 
relevant regional fisheries management organization.
For the purposes of coastal State regulation of fishing activities in the EEZ, 
paragraph 3.1.1 is a straightforward assertion of the need for vessels to 
comply with the domestic law of the coastal State. Paragraphs 3.1.2 and 
3.1.3 imply the obligation of States to create at the domestic level binding 
laws for vessels. In the waters under the jurisdiction of coastal States, illegal 
fishing will occur as determined by such domestic legislation (Palma et 
al. 2010: 30), which will in turn be conditioned by existing international 
obligations. If domestic laws do not exist or are inadequate and, as a 
consequence, vessels are able to operate with impunity in ways that 
undermine regional and international conservation rules applicable to the 
coastal State, this may be indicative of underlying deficits in that State’s 
observance of international law.
3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been 
misreported, to the relevant national authority, in 
contravention of national laws and regulations; or
3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant 
regional fisheries management organization which have not 
been reported or have been misreported, in contravention 
of the reporting procedures of that organization.
The second perspective, unreported fishing, refers first to activities by 
vessels that contravene the specific domestic laws that regulate the 
reporting of fishing activity or catch. In this sense, unreported fishing is 
simply a sub-category of illegal fishing. Like paragraph 3.1.2, paragraph 
3.2.2 refers to activities that contravene the secondary rules stemming 
from international organisations collectively known as regional fishery 
management organisations (RFMOs).2 Most RFMOs are generally engaged 
in the management and conservation of straddling or highly migratory 
2 IPOA IUU Paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
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species occurring in whole or in part in the high seas, but not domestic 
stock occurring exclusively in the EEZ. The requirement in paragraph 3.2 
of the IPOA for a rule contravention implies that vessels flagged to States 
that have not agreed to abide by the rules of the RFMOs are excluded 
from this prong of the description. 
3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional 
fisheries management organization that are conducted 
by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of 
a State not party to that organization, or by a fishing entity, 
in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes 
the conservation and management measures of that 
organization; or
3.3.2 in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are 
no applicable conservation or management measures and 
where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner 
inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation 
of living marine resources under international law.
3.4 Notwithstanding paragraph 3.3, certain unregulated fishing 
may take place in a manner which is not in violation of applicable 
international law, and may not require the application of measures 
envisaged under the International Plan of Action (IPOA).
Unregulated fishing, the third perspective, has two distinct aspects. The 
first one refers to activities carried out within the regulatory competence 
areas of RFMOs, but by vessels that are either not flagged to any State or 
are flagged to a State that has not agreed to abide by the RFMO rules. The 
second one refers to activities that undermine or contravene international 
law where there is no applicable regional regulation. Although the term 
unregulated fishing has been predominantly associated with high-seas 
fishing activities3, subparagraph 3.3.2 potentially concerns EEZ stock in 
circumstances where the coastal State has not exercised prescriptive 
3 See Agenda 21, paragraph 17.45, and the Preface of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Rome, 1995. 
The FSA also makes reference to unregulated fishing in its Preamble. 
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jurisdiction appropriately and has left regulatory voids that leave 
stocks unprotected. Paragraph 3.4 of the IPOA seems to suggest that 
paragraph 3.3 is intended to capture activities that evidence underlying 
inconsistencies with international law (Theilen 2013). The implication of 
this, with regard to subparagraph 3.3.1, is that the activities referred to 
therein must be inconsistent with the regulatory State’s obligations under 
international law, even if this is not specifically stated in the paragraph. 
Hence, the intention of paragraph 3.4 is to bring paragraph 3.3 in its 
entirety in line with the two previous paragraphs, and all of the activities 
to which they refer, as the bases for the adoption of the market and other 
measures set out in subsequent parts of the IPOA. 
The description of IUU fishing contained in the IPOA is of relevance to 
the coastal State in respect of each of the three perspectives, insofar 
as all three potentially refer to fishery activities that may contravene or 
undermine legal conservation and management rules in the EEZ, or that 
are otherwise exploitative of deficits in domestic fishery regulation. 
Drivers and Global Impacts of IUU Fishing
The drivers of IUU fishing are predominantly financial: gains are 
derived from the ability to trade with undiscerning markets and 
enhanced by evading regulatory costs. (Flothmann et al. 2010) Given 
the regulated nature of fisheries activities, the perpetuation of IUU 
fishing is facilitated by deficiencies in regulatory frameworks and by a 
lack of rigorous execution by the public authorities with responsibility 
for fishery governance.4 
An important part of the impacts derived from overfishing are 
believed to be attributable to IUU Fishing (FAO 2014). Broadly, these 
encompass fish-stock depletion (Agnew et al. 2009) as well as the 
erosion of food and work security in diverse fishery-dependent human 
4 For further information on the effects of deficient governance, see Le Gallic, Bertrand, and Anthony Cox, “An 
Economic Analysis of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: Key Drivers and Possible Solutions.” Marine 
Policy 30, no. 6 (2006): 689–95. Also, see Pauly, Daniel. “Beyond Duplicity and Ignorance in Global Fisheries.” Scientia 
Marina 73, no. 2 (2009): 215–24. 
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populations (Pitcher et al. 2002).5 
Despite the difficulties associated with the detection and recording of 
infractions, IUU fishing is widely thought to inflict vast costs to the global 
economy, with a frequently cited study suggesting between US$ 10 and 
23.5 Billion per annum (Agnew et al. 2009). According to a 2015 publication 
by the European Union (EU), costs might be in the region of Euro 10 Billion 
per year, which corresponds to 19% of the worldwide reported value of 
catches (EU Directorate of Maritime Affairs). Least-developed countries 
are among the most vulnerable, due to the fact that reliance on fish for 
nutrition tends to be greater than in developed countries, (FAO 2014: p 7; 
Allison, E. H. et al. 2009) and reliance on production and exportation of fish 
products is also greater (54% of all fish exports by value, and over 60% by 
quantity) (FAO 2014: p 8), while ability to plan and execute adaptation to 
biomass reduction is diminished by a lack of capacity (Allison et al. 2009). 
IUU fishing undermines the long-term profitability of the fishing industry, being 
not only a resource drain but also a source of unfair competition to law-
abiding fishers: as IUU fishing operators are unencumbered by regulatory 
and legal constraints, they benefit from quota diverted from legal fishers 
and income withheld from fisheries authorities (Stokke 2009). In turn, the 
presence of IUU fishing can intensify pressure on authorities to increase 
quotas, as well as undermine fishers’ appetite for compliance (ibid.). 
Further, as those who engage in IUU operations must act covertly, they 
contribute to the emergence and perpetuation of corruption in seafood 
production and distribution chains (Standing 2008; Sundstrom 2012). 
The secrecy and unpredictability that characterise many IUU fishing 
operations can pose serious difficulty to fishery managers entrusted with 
the detection of illicit activity and the identification of the vessels involved 
(Rashid & Pramod 2010). IUU operations undermine the rule of law and may 
5 See also: Srinivasan, U. Thara, William W. L. Cheung, Reg Watson, and U. Rashid Sumaila. “Food Security Implications 
of Global Marine Catch Losses due to Overfishing.” Journal of Bioeconomics 12, no. 3 (2010): 183–200. Garcia, Serge 
M., and Andrew A. Rosenberg. “Food security and marine capture fisheries: characteristics, trends, drivers and future 
perspectives.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 365.1554 (2010): 
2869-2880. Le Manach, Frederic, Charlotte Gough, Alasdair Harris, Frances Humber, Sarah Harper, and Dirk Zeller. 
“Unreported Fishing, Hungry People and Political Turmoil: The Recipe for a Food Security Crisis in Madagascar?” Marine 
Policy 36, no. 1 (2012): 218–25. Flückiger, Matthias, and Markus Ludwig. “Economic shocks in the fisheries sector and 
maritime piracy.” Journal of Development Economics 114 (2015): 107-125.
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facilitate transnational crimes, (UNGA Res. 63/112 2008)6 with investigative 
work undertaken in recent years serving to highlight the vulnerability of 
the sector to trafficking of persons, slavery and the transportation of drugs 
(EJF 2011).
IUU Fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone
Collectively, EEZs cover only 35% of the total ocean area but contain around 
90% of the world’s fish stocks (Fact sheet EU 2015), including species that are 
attractive to operators, due to their economic value.  IUU fishing activities 
taking place in the EEZ have direct detrimental impacts on the domestic 
economies that ought to benefit from the economic potential of such 
stock. First, insofar as IUU fishing may impact artisanal fisheries, given their 
generally higher contribution to employment, it undermines work security. 
For example, coastal African communities are comparatively vulnerable, 
as artisanal fisheries contribute 0.43% to the GDP, versus the 0.36 contributed 
by industrial marine fisheries, while employing the vast majority of national 
vessels. It has been estimated that addressing IUU fishing in the West African 
region and developing fisheries appropriately may create more than 
300,000 jobs (ODI 2016). Second, the illegal capture of certain domestic 
high-value species, coupled with discards and extensive underreporting, 
is thought to have significant detrimental effects on the sustainability of 
affected economies (FAO 2014: p 13). Commercially important species, 
such as cephalopods, shrimp, demersals and small pelagics, are believed 
to be overexploited, with around 48% of West African stock believed to be 
captured to unsustainable levels (ibid: p 39). 
Certain patterns characterise IUU fishing operations. A lack of transparency 
and unclear administrative structures in some States facilitates misreporting 
as well as irregular access by foreign vessels to domestic stock.7 Yet, 
6 See also: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry: Focusing on Trafficking 
in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants and Illicit Drugs Trafficking, Vienna, 2011. 
7 On the subject of the link between IUU fishing and private licensing, see EJF press release, Bold Action Taken by 
Korea to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Shows EU IUU Regulation is Working (2015). The 
importance assigned to private licensing verification protocols by the Spanish government in the fight against IUU 
fishing is reflected in its 2015 agreement with Curaçao. Official announcement available at http://www.lamoncloa.
gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/news/Paginas/2015/20150724-illegalfishing.aspx   
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despite commonalities in modi operandi, IUU fishing is not exclusive to 
particular ocean regions.
By way of illustration, in West Africa, according to FAO records, save 
for Guinea Bissau and Mauritania, coastal States provide insufficient 
information on volumes and composition of foreign vessel captures 
in their EEZs, eroding the accuracy of catch estimates. Cross checking 
of submissions is hampered by joint venture operations and chartering 
arrangements between distant water vessels and local companies, which 
makes catch attribution and traceability more challenging (ibid: p 12). 
Inevitably, fragile States with resource-rich waters, endemic poverty and 
high perceived levels of systemic corruption are particularly vulnerable 
to the irregular fishery access practices frequently linked to IUU fishing 
(Agnew et al. 2009; Standing 2008).
It is important to note that deficiencies in connection with data reporting 
are not unique to fisheries dependent on developing countries for their 
regulation.8 The effect of suboptimal monitoring, recording and data-
sharing practices is serious, with recent research suggesting there is an 
astonishing asymmetry between official figures and the likely reality of 
captures, with systematic underreporting believed to have been as high 
as 53% in recent years (Pauly & Zeller 2016).
The link between deficient coastal State control and the proliferation of 
IUU fishing in the EEZ is also illustrated by events of recent years in Thailand. 
The European Commission issued a warning to Thailand in 2012 in respect 
of the presence of IUU fishing products in exports to the EU (Commission 
decision 2012). According to this communication by the European 
Commission, over 95% of catches, including those of the artisanal fleet, 
may have been underreported to Thai authorities as a result of endemic 
deficiencies in domestic fishing vessel registration practices. These were 
compounded by systemic data-sharing failures resulting from tensions 
and administrative discrepancies between the different departments 
involved in fisheries regulation. As a result, overexploitation and 
uncontrolled competing pressure on decreasing resources led to more 
of the local vessels resorting to illegal and destructive practices to secure 
captures (ibid.). Further, civil society reports have linked the absence of 
8 See, for example, the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), Report 39, Milan, 2015, paragraph 57.
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adequate fishery controls in Thailand to the emergence of wrongs of a 
criminal nature, with the reliance on migrant smuggling to secure cheap 
work on board fishing vessels flagged as a particularly prevalent problem. 
According to these accounts, foreign persons that were often unskilled 
and unable to communicate effectively had been indentured to work 
on Thailand’s fishing vessels and regularly subjected to inhumane working 
conditions, torture and even murder at the hands of captains and the 
senior crew.9 
Hence, in addition to being detrimental to stocks and their environment, 
to the rule of law and to the effectiveness of fisheries governance, IUU 
fishing inflicts detrimental impacts on diverse human populations and 
undermines the fabric of fisheries economies. These effects justify the 
inclusion of IUU fishing in maritime security strategies.10 IUU fishing can be 
understood as a threat to human security (Bueger 2015), irrespective of 
whether it occurs domestically or beyond areas of national jurisdiction.
The Importance of Coastal State Governance
Much attention has been paid in international legal literature to the 
governance of high seas (Molenaar 2007; Serdy 2011; Barnes 2012; Elferink 
2012; Takei 2013) and to deficient control of fishing vessels by flag States 
(Bratspies 2001; Warner Kramer 2004; Rayfuse 2005; Erceg 2006; Miller 
2014). This is not surprising, given the high commercial value of straddling 
and highly migratory species, such as tuna and billfishes. One of the most 
important treaties for the governance of wild fisheries, the 1995 Fish Stocks 
Agreement (FSA) (Agreement 1995), is exclusively concerned with their 
regulation. Although the FSA may shape the conservation and protection 
of straddling and highly migratory stock partly occurring in the EEZ (ibid: 
Art. 5), neither it nor another important treaty for the purposes of IUU fishing 
9 See EJF audio-visual reports Sold to the Sea and Pirates and Slaves: http://ejfoundation.org/video/sold-sea-human-
trafficking-thailands-fishing-industry-0 and http://ejfoundation.org/report/pirates-and-slaves-how-overfishing-thailand-
fuels-human-trafficking-and-plundering-our-oceans For other examples of crew abuses on board of fishing vessels, 
see Ian Urbina’s Stowaways and Crimes Aboard a Scofflaw Ship, New York Times, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/19/world/stowaway-crime-scofflaw-ship.html 
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control, the 1993 Compliance Agreement (Agreement 1993), extend to 
the regulation by coastal States of stock that occurs exclusively within an 
EEZ.
Yet, governance by the coastal State of EEZ resources is at least of equal 
importance. EEZs not only harbour the vast majority of the ocean’s living 
resources (Barnes 2006: 233), but, as already stated, they also form 
part of coastal economies and make an important contribution to the 
international economy through exports, fishery support activities and the 
granting of access to foreign fleets. 
Coastal State Governance of EEZ Resources and 
International Law
The protection of the resources of the EEZ and their interlinked environments 
is entrusted to coastal States under international law, which is a reflection 
of the sovereign rights they hold for the exploration and exploitation of 
the EEZ’s economic potential (LOSC: Art. 56.1. (a) and (b)). Where stocks 
are transboundary, meaning they occur in part outside of the EEZ, due 
to migratory patterns or habitat geography, their good management 
requires cooperation, either with other States or through participation 
in RFMOs or similar bodies (LOSC: Art. 118). Such participation involves 
regular discussion in regard to institutional rules, collective rationalisations 
and expectations and supervisory and data-checking processes that can 
be absent in respect of the regulation of stock not requiring cooperation 
with an RFMO.11
In order to manage fisheries and control IUU fishing, coastal States employ 
domestic public law and regulation, and these tools may be conditioned 
by a number of international legal prescriptions and limitations.  First, insofar 
as fishing activities and processes in the EEZ may impact components of 
11 See, for example, the second paragraph after question 4, on page 16 of the written statement submitted to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission in their Request for an Advisory 
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marine biodiversity, domestic fishery management is of interest to the legal 
regime established by the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (Barnes 
2010: 543). Second, the presence of species vulnerable to extinction in 
the fishery may make the trade of specimens of concern under the 1973 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) (Convention 1973). Most importantly, for the purposes of 
IUU fishing control, the conservation of marine-living resources is a stated 
objective of the LOSC, which specifies in its Preamble: ‘Recognizing the 
desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the 
sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will 
facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful 
uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their 
resources, the conservation of their living resources and the study, protection 
and preservation of the marine environment’ (LOSC Preamble: p 4).
Despite the fact that the implementation of the conservation provisions 
contained in parts V and XII of the LOSC is important for the development 
of IUU fishing control measures in the EEZ, compliance can, in many 
cases, be considered deficient (Churchill 2012: 813). Observance of the 
conservation obligations of the LOSC is an inherent part of the exercise 
of the sovereign rights assigned by the Convention to coastal States in 
respect of the utilisation of their EEZ (LOSC: Art. 56, 61, 193). However, 
Part V of the LOSC affords coastal States a wide margin of discretion in 
determining where the balance between conservation and utilisation 
should rest. The implication of the Part V provisions is that coastal States 
must make sure that the living resources of the EEZ are not subjected to 
overexploitation and are maintained at sustainable levels (LOSC: Art. 
56.1(b) (iii) and 61). For example, coastal States must determine the total 
allowable catch in the EEZ (LOSC: Art. 61.1.), and this must be done by 
taking into account the best scientific evidence available to the coastal 
State and subject to an obligation to ensure that the resources are not 
overexploited (LOSC: Art. 61.2.).
Adopted measures must ensure that stocks can produce their maximum 
sustainable yield, but conservation is conditioned by certain qualifications 
(Barnes 2006). These include environmental and economic factors, such 
as the needs of coastal communities and developing States, among 
other possible elements (LOSC: Art. 61.3). Subject to this, the coastal State 
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must have in place a suitable domestic regime that ensures the optimum 
utilisation of the marine-living resources in their EEZs (LOSC: Art. 56.1(b) (iii), 
and Art. 62.1.). In order to achieve this, the coastal State shall determine its 
own harvesting capacity, and where it cannot harvest the entire allowable 
catch, it shall make arrangements with other States to permit their fleets 
access to any surplus (LOSC: Art. 62.2) for which the LOSC allows a wide 
degree of discretion (LOSC: Art. 62.3.). In specifying the conditions upon 
which the nationals of other States may operate in its EEZ, the coastal State 
is enabled to put in place measures such as licences, fees and other forms 
of financing and compensation, specification of catches and capture 
periods, seasons, fish age and size, specification of gear, sampling, 
placing of observers, data sharing, cooperative arrangements’ terms and 
conditions and enforcement procedures (LOSC: Art. 62.4(a) to (k)). These 
conservation and utilisation provisions may have achieved international 
customary law status, which would imply that they are obligatory, even for 
States that have not ratified or acceded to the LOSC (Markovski 2009: 13), 
but their generality means that they are open to interpretation (Barnes 
2006: p 237), and such open texture means that they are less than ideal 
for operationalisation as effective conduct standards. 
Insofar as IUU fishing control is concerned, the LOSC is ostensibly silent. 
However, its conservation provisions have been given some additional 
specificity in that regard by the ITLOS in the Request for an Advisory Opinion 
Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (ITLOS 21) (ITLOS 
Reports 2014: p 404). ITLOS 21 emphasises the conservation obligations 
of the coastal State as specifically incorporating the protection of the 
resource against vessels engaged in IUU fishing (ITLOS 21: p 16). This is 
implied also in respect of the obligations to determine allowable catches 
in the EEZ and ‘to ensure’ that the resources are not overexploited, 
through the adoption of adequate laws, regulations and enforcement 
measures (ITLOS 21: p 104, 105). Hence, the obligation to address IUU 
fishing is assigned to the coastal State (ibid: p 106) as part of its general 
obligations to conserve and develop the living resources in the EEZ. These 
are set out in LOSC Article 63.1, which, according to the ITLOS, underpins 
the meaning of ‘sustainable management’ (ibid: p 189, 191).12  
12 The general obligations and rights of the coastal State in respect of the conservation and management of fisheries are 
contained in LOSC Articles 61, 62, 73, 192 and 193.
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Further clarity in respect of the nature of these obligations is afforded by 
ITLOS by way of reference to the Advisory Opinion for Responsibilities and 
Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area13, where the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber held the view that a ‘responsibility to ensure’ 
implies the need for obligations derived from international law to become 
effective for private actors operating under domestic law; this involves 
the fulfilment of international obligations by States through their conduct, 
namely by exercising their power over the domestic actors under their 
control (ITLOS 21: p 108). The nature of these obligations is not that of 
achieving a specific result but ‘to deploy adequate means, to exercise 
best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result’ (ITLOS 21: p 
110). In essence, this is a ‘due diligence’ obligation (ITLOS 21: p 111), 
which implies the adoption and enforcement of regulatory measures and 
vigilance in the exercise of administrative controls, such as the monitoring 
of activities by private operators.14 
The elaboration by ITLOS of the detail of these provisions ostensibly refers 
to the duties of the flag State. However, the Tribunal clarifies in paragraph 
124 that the responsibilities for the conservation and management of 
the resources of the EEZ under the LOSC, including the adoption of legal 
and regulatory compliance measures, correspond to both the flag and 
the coastal State, with the latter in fact bearing the primary responsibility 
(ITLOS 21: p 115, 124). This equation in the nature of responsibilities is logical, 
particularly since the coastal State is also the flag State for the purposes of 
the control of domestic vessels operating in the EEZ. Hence, coastal States 
are expected to deploy a wide range of prescriptive measures of a legal, 
regulatory and administrative character, as well as enforcement measures 
enabling inspection and boarding, arrest and the commencement of 
judicial proceedings (ibid: p 105) and to impose penalties in accordance 
with the provisions of the LOSC (LOSC: art. 73).
There are no binding international legal parameters of which fishery 
conducts must be addressed in respect of non-transboundary EEZ stock. 
A list of activities is found in FSA Article 21.11, which, before the term IUU 
fishing had officially been coined, had typified specific activities that it 
13 Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS 
Reports 2011, p. 10, at p. 41, as cited at ITLOS 21, paragraph 128. 
14 As per the Case Concerning Pulp Mills On The River Uruguay, (Argentina V. Uruguay), Request For The Indication of 
Provisional Measures. ICJ Reports, 2007, p. 77, paragraph 187, also cited at ITLOS 21, paragraphs 128 and 131.
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referred to as ‘serious violations’ (FSA : Art. 21.11.). Among these, some 
specifications, such as falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or 
registration of a fishing vessel (ibid: Art. 21.11(f)) or concealing, tampering 
with or disposing of evidence relating to an investigation, (ibid: Art. 
21.11(g)) aim at the heart of IUU fishing practices. Although the obligations 
contained in FSA Article 21, in respect of serious violations, are primarily 
directed at members of RFMOs undertaking at-sea inspections and at-
vessel flag States; coastal States parties to the FSA must address them 
where relevant in the context of their cooperation with RFMOs.15 However, 
these provisions only apply to straddling and highly migratory stock, not 
extending to the management of species outside RFMO management. 
A more-extensive list, including transhipment, is included in European 
Council Regulation (EC) 1005/2008 (Council Regulation 1005/2008), 
referring to vessel activities not limited to highly migratory and straddling 
stock or areas under the management of RFMOs (EU Council Reg. 2008). 
Yet, this list is only relevant to States that are members or trading partners 
of the European Union. Finally, despite these requirements to address 
specific vessel activities, important coastal State obligations remain too 
general. For instance, the specifics of what constitute the adequate 
assessment of biomass or the optimum determination of TAC and quota 
distributions are ultimately left at the discretion of the coastal State and 
whatever economic interests it chooses to serve. 
By contrast, a number of conduct standards for fighting IUU fishing are 
specified in considerable detail in the IPOA IUU, which is not legally binding. 
These voluntary norms include, inter alia, the elaboration of evidentiary 
and admissibility standards, including the use of electronic evidence 
(IPOA IUU: p 17), the deployment of adequate monitoring, control and 
surveillance mechanisms (ibid. p 24), the elaboration of a penalty regime 
outside the rigours of criminal proceedings (ibid. p 21), the carving of an 
evidentiary role in judicial proceedings (ibid. p 51) and the introduction 
of enhanced reporting requirements, (see: Edeson 2000)16 to name but a 
few. 
15 FSA, Article 7, specifying compatibility measures applicable to coastal States.
16 According to Edeson’s report, such requirements had previously been introduced in other international and domestic 
instruments, such as the Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United States of America and the US Lacey Act.
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Brief Introduction to Accountability
Accountability in a general sense refers to the vast array of public and 
non-public mechanisms whereby a community in pursuit of desired policy 
objectives balances order and freedom (Dubnick & Yang 2009). The 
myriad potential adaptations of which accountability is capable within 
this very broad definition enable it to transcend traditional disciplinary 
boundaries (Rached 2016). In the global governance arena, accountability 
mechanisms may include a wide range of legal and non-legal norms, 
requirements, conditions and standards and their associated processes and 
protocols, articulated for the purpose of learning, assessing and shaping 
the conduct or performance of an international actor (Grant & Keohane 
2005; Bovens 2007). The conduct rules that are relevant to IUU fishing control 
are established in general norms of international law, normative treaty 
provisions, non-binding rules derived from voluntary international instruments, 
as well as domestic law and regulation, and regional legal and non-legal 
rules. Hence, promoting adequate responses by coastal States in the EEZ 
to such an array of rules requires a plurality of accountability mechanisms. 
Availability of mechanisms should not be reduced to what is available in 
the domestic realm, if human security and the promotion of opportunities 
for meeting important human needs, such as nutrition and work, are to be 
addressed fairly. While options in respect of the accountability of the State’s 
administrative agencies will likely be richer and more coherently articulated 
in the domestic sphere, the effects of deficient regulatory performance by 
the coastal State can be felt beyond its national boundaries (see Mashaw 
2006). Exclusively domestic mechanisms may be inaccessible to some of 
those upon which such effects fall.
In the context of relationships between and amongst international 
actors, where certain expectations of performance exist in respect of 
shared or common interests, accountability has often been equated with 
data-sharing processes that seek to improve management and foster 
transparency (Krisch & Benedict 2006). While there can be little doubt that 
transparency is essential for accountability, some authors also argue that 
one of the key implications of accountability is that potential ex-post-facto 
consequences should follow transgressions or shortfalls in performance 
against assumed obligations and related conduct standards (Grant & 
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Keohane 2005). Whether the need for consequences is accepted as a 
necessary aspect of accountability or not, ascertaining the existence and 
nature of the rules under which conduct expectations are formed is an 
essential first step in ascertaining whether and how accountability may 
be facilitated. 
Accountability Mechanisms Incorporating Legal 
Rules of Conduct
In order to understand whether traditional international law can facilitate 
accountability in respect of coastal State deficiencies in IUU fishing control, 
it is first necessary to explore whether specific norms may function as an 
appropriate rule of conduct against which assessments can be made. 
Traditional international law contains a chapter in the form of the rules of 
State Responsibility, as codified by the International Law Commission (ILC) 
by way of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) (ILC Draft Articles 2001: p 26).  While it may seem 
axiomatic that, in the exercise of their rights, States must comply with their 
international legal obligations (Crawford 2012: 450), acts and omissions 
by States may, under certain circumstances, give rise to an international 
wrong in respect of which the State will be deemed responsible (Shaw 
2008: 781).  According to Article 2 of ARSIWA, an international wrong 
occurs when an international legal obligation that was attributable to 
a State has been contravened (ILC Draft Articles 2001). In respect of 
this attribution requirement, it must be pointed out that, under normal 
circumstances, IUU fishing is carried out by private operators and not 
by or on behalf of States. But as already discussed, the notion that the 
State has obligations to prevent damaging activities by persons under its 
control has been well established through the principle of due diligence 
(Tzevelekos 2010). Under the LOSC, coastal States have conservation 
obligations, and this extends to obligations to regulate and control fishing 
activities in the EEZ. This involves the need for coastal States to exercise 
their power over operators carrying out IUU activities under the State’s 
own domestic law. While the conduct of such persons may not be carried 
out on behalf of the coastal State, the State may fail in applying sufficient 
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diligence and vigilance in the exercise of its obligations and thus become 
internationally responsible. Such Responsibility implies the breach of a 
binding international obligation. The conservation obligations of the LOSC 
are indeed binding in nature, but their generality, conditionality and 
absence of relevant transparency provisions undermines their potential 
as conduct rules with which to facilitate the accountability of the coastal 
State (Barnes 2006: p 239). 
Much-more-defined State conduct rules in respect of all State and specific 
coastal State IUU fishing control have been established in the IPOA IUU. 
The IPOA was constructed under the auspices of the UN and for which 
there is wide endorsement by States (Palma et al. 2010: 95). Despite this, 
its non-binding nature has the effect of emasculating the efficacy of the 
conduct standards it contains in the strict context of State Responsibility, 
except where specific provisions have been integrated into domestic law. 
Particularly limiting is the provision in Part XV of the LOSC, whereby coastal 
States are exempted from having to accept submissions from other States 
in the context of judicial disputes involving sovereign rights with regard 
to EEZ fisheries, including harvesting management and conservation 
(LOSC : Art. 297.3 (a)). As coastal States are excluded from the scope 
of the compulsory procedures of the Convention, entailing binding 
decisions, the LOSC specifies that any such disputes be instead resolved 
by conciliation for amicable settlement (LOSC : Art. 297.3(b)(i)), including 
in cases where it may be alleged that the living resources of the EEZ are 
seriously endangered. The LOSC is specific in underlining that the discretion 
of the coastal State is paramount for the purposes of conciliation (LOSC: 
Art. 297.3(c)). It is therefore doubtful that conservation decisions made by 
the coastal State, including those related to IUU fishing control, may be 
challengeable through the judicial mechanisms of the LOSC.  
Perceived contraventions of legal obligations may also result in unilateral 
processes involving restrictive measures of an economic nature in order to 
influence the behaviour of the State perceived to be in breach, carried out 
within the framework of the World Trade Organisation (Chamovitz 2001).17 
For instance, a fishery may be harvested only domestically, but in an 
17 Churchill (2012) argues that unilateral measures of this kind, such as the measures taken by Chile against the European 
Union in the months that preceded the Swordfish litigation, can be understood as a type of countermeasure. 
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increasingly inter-dependent world, a proportion of the resulting seafood 
products may be destined to international markets. Communities in other 
States may rely on such products, whether as a source of work or nutrition. 
Those States may perceive the IUU activities in the coastal State as being 
detrimental to their nation and/or their policies, and they may seek ways 
to induce compliance with fisheries conservation norms by way of trade 
measures. The European Union has established one of the most important 
mechanisms of this nature by virtue of Council Regulation 1005/2008 (the 
IUU Regulation). This regime is primarily targeted at the accountability of 
flag States18, but is also relevant to cases where domestic stock harvested 
by the coastal State’s own national vessels is subsequently exported to the 
EU, as, in these circumstances, the coastal State will also be the flag State. 
The interactive mechanism in the IUU Regulation works by way of a system 
of port notice and access authorisations (Council Regulation 1005/2008: 
Art. 6 to 8) and inspection procedures (ibid: Art. 9 to 11) combined with the 
utilisation of catch certificates for importation and exportation of fishery 
products (ibid: Art. 12 to 16). The catch certificates must be validated by 
the third country vessel’s flag State (ibid: Art. 15.1) and may be subject 
to verification processes carried out by the competent authorities of a 
member State of the European Union (ibid: Art. 17.2). Irregularities with the 
catch certificate or the products it accompanies may result in a number 
of negative consequences. These may include the refusal of importation 
of a consignment (ibid: Art. 18), if it is not accompanied by a catch 
certificate or is accompanied by one that misrepresents the products, is 
not validated by the right authority, is incomplete, does not meet indirect 
importation rules, has been caught by a vessel in an IUU vessel blacklist 
or has been validated by a flag State identified as non-cooperating (ibid: 
Art. 18.1 (a) to (g)). Sanctions linked to IUU fishing may include black listing 
of vessels (ibid: Art. 27 and 30) and, following a dialectical process of 
information, the issuance of a public warning of pending non-cooperating 
status, which may culminate in the suspension of market access until the 
identified cooperation deficits have been addressed (ibid: Art. 33 and 35).
The market mechanism established by the IUU Regulation allows sufficient 
flexibility to permit conduct assessment against legal norms as well as 
quasi-legal standards of conduct, such as the rules of the RFMOs for States 
that have either adopted membership or agreed to cooperate with 
18 For an overview of the rationale of the trade measures deployed by the EU, see the Preamble to Council Regulation 
1005/2008, paragraphs 5, 9, 13 and 31. 
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these organisations (ibid: Art. 31.3 and 31.6 (b)). Further, in the context of 
this mechanism, legal norms have been interpreted by reference to the 
more-specific rules of the IPOA.19
Despite these strengths, however, regimes of this nature have limitations. 
First, in contrast to access agreements, these mechanisms have little 
reach in cases where the domestic stock has been harvested in the EEZ 
by foreign vessels, as the trade-related measures upon which it relies as 
ultimate sanctions are imposed on the exporting nation, which is not 
the coastal State but the fishing vessel’s flag State (ibid: p 10).20 Second, 
while one of its advantages is that it can rely on standards contained in 
the quasi-legal rules of the RFMOs, these are not directly relevant to the 
protection of non-transboundary domestic stock: where they address IUU 
fishing activities, these rules involve capture activities vis-à-vis the stock 
they manage in their regulatory areas, which will normally occur at least 
partially in the high seas. Last, market accountability, even if underpinned 
by a substantial legal and regulatory framework, is no substitute for judicial 
processes, as it is not only able to directly contribute to legal interpretation 
but is also less sensitive to the relative power of the parties to the dispute 
(Charnovitz 2001). By contrast, market-related mechanisms are unlikely to 
be either resisted or deployed by the less economically developed States 
or by those with dependent markets (Grant & Keohane 2005). Inevitably, 
inter-State (or inter-public, if one party is a supranational entity like the 
EU) accountability mechanisms with a marked economic component 
favour hegemonic markets, which are able to interpret and develop 
accountability conduct rules and standards to their preferences.
Other opportunities for accountability may be created where harvesting 
States wishing to reinforce conservation and the rule of law may, for instance, 
increase their use of bilateral or multilateral fisheries agreements. Such 
agreements usually emphasise conduct rules for vessel operators and flag 
States but may also establish specific regimes for cooperation between the 
flag and coastal States that may otherwise be missing. This is particularly so 
19 By way of illustration, Commission Decision of 21 April 2015 in respect of the Kingdom of Thailand, which states at 
sub-section 3.3 paragraph (80), in reference to Thailand’s domestic legislation development with respect to fishery 
management, interpreting a framework legal rule by incorporation of a non-legal rule: Finally, a deterrent sanctioning 
scheme is not included which undermines Thailand’s capacity to fulfill the requirements of Article 73 of UNCLOS 
regarding enforcement of laws and regulations, and point 21 of the IPOA IUU. 
20 However, foreign vessels operating under bareboat charter or joint venture arrangements may export under the 
nationality of the coastal State. 
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in alternative scenarios, where vessels operate under private licenses with a 
coastal State.21 Access agreements have the potential to add considerable 
definition and depth to the conservation and management obligations of 
the LOSC. They may, among other possibilities, incorporate provisions on 
scientific cooperation, transparency and sensitive operational issues, such 
as vessel tracking and transhipment. Further, where domestic stocks are 
shared between the flag and coastal States through medium to long-term 
agreements, the mutual expectations they create in respect of on-going 
interests and their associated obligations may foster efforts in attaining and 
maintaining sustainability. Shared efforts can be reinforced if both States 
keep making each other accountable through mutually acceptable 
disclosure, supervision and dialogue procedures and a mutually agreed-
upon system of rewards. Additionally, where such agreements are able to 
supersede the frequently opaque private licensing agreements mentioned 
above, they have the potential to make a significant contribution to 
transparency that, in turn, can only strengthen the accountability of 
all parties and actors relevant to the agreement. The ability of fisheries 
agreements to contribute towards better fishery regulation has been duly 
noted by the ITLOS (ITLOS 21: 32, p 114, 115).
Indirect international accountability strategies beyond the limited options 
afforded by these approaches does exist, albeit not concerned directly 
with fish stock management or vessel control. Tangential mechanisms may 
include the reporting and compliance procedures under CITES in respect 
of the trade in endangered marine wildlife captured in the context of an 
IUU fishing operation (CITES 1973: Art.8 p. 7). These mechanisms, though not 
devoid of potential, are currently of limited relevance to the conservation 
of commercial stock vulnerable to IUU fishing.  
Other Miscellaneous Accountability Mechanisms
The collective trade-related measures deployed by RFMOs and other 
multilateral environmental agreements are rarely directly relevant for the 
21  For concerns raised in respect of such practices, see ITLOS 21, pp. 49, paragraph 176.
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protection of domestic non-transboundary stock. Market- and port-entry 
denial, vessel black lists and product documentation have and continue 
to be deployed as measures to combat IUU fishing. The same criticism 
levelled at the IUU Regulation can be applied to these mechanisms in 
respect of market asymmetries (Stokke 2009). In particular, RFMOs can 
only address IUU fishing activities involving the stock they manage in their 
regulatory areas, which by definition will be straddling, highly migratory or 
discrete to the high seas, and will exclude non-transboundary domestic 
stock.
While accountability in the mechanisms specified in the above paragraphs 
are inter-public and can be demanded by States or international 
organisations, other mechanisms exist with some potential to foster 
accountability in respect of IUU fishing control, albeit without directly 
engaging the coastal State in a unitary sense. Certification standards, 
such as those promoted by the Marine Stewardship Council, can contain 
inbuilt mechanisms able to identify and filter IUU captures; these may 
include monitoring, transparency and traceability requirements that are 
mandatory throughout the supply chain and rules that prevent scheme 
participants from trading IUU products (Agnew 2015). Through fishery-
developing guidelines, less-developed coastal States may be able to 
benefit from Western economy commitments to sustainable sourcing, 
and through the interface of certification programmes and associated 
training mechanisms, practices and governance may be improved 
following a bottom-up approach. In this kind of market accountability, 
the State is not engaged directly; it is the fishery enterprise that commits 
to meet sustainability, environmental impact and effective management 
standards of a technical nature, which are independently assessed 
(MSC 2014a). There is no direct engagement vis-à-vis other States 
either, but transnationally to an entity that acts as mediator with the 
retail industry and, ultimately, consumers. The mechanism is able to 
foster accountability, insofar as it contains supervisory and transparency 
mechanisms over producers as well as incentives that may be lost if 
conducts deviate from established standards, including tracking and 
benchmarking indicators for projects with sustainability potential but 
need of improvement (MSC 2014b). Further, its associated governance 
and sustainability benefits should benefit dependent communities as well 
as support stock recovery and fishery development, while disincentivising 
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IUU fishing (Anderson 2016). Approaches such as these are promising 
and contain much potential but will need substantial effort by those 
concerned as well as other actors, such as civil society, before visible 
improvements in coastal State governance become evident. Civil society 
may need to explore potentially complementary domestic mechanisms 
able to counterbalance the effects of poor governance in respect of IUU 
fishing control. These may involve rights of an administrative nature, such 
as participation and due process, if domestic legislation provides avenues 
for such bottom-up approaches to accountability. This may, for example, 
involve the provision of management rights or the ability to demand a 
review following the exclusion of affected communities from certain 
interventions and decisions that significantly undermine the relied-upon 
resources (Dellinger  2013), such as decisions involving foreign access to 
fisheries. However, this approach only serves communities able to trigger 
domestic tools of an administrative or legal nature, leaving impacts 
beyond the boundaries of the coastal State unaddressed. Notably, 
Goal 16 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, namely, to ‘promote 
peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide 
access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels’, is directly relevant (UNGA Res. 70/1 2015) and calls 
for reflection upon how these mechanisms could be made more inclusive 
and comprehensive. The relationship between the sound management 
of domestic fisheries and the development of domestic administrative 
approaches to State agency accountability, particularly in vulnerable 
and developing countries, is also synergistic with the objectives of the Rio 
20 Declaration, The Future We Want, in the context of development and 
the rule of law (UNGA Res. 66/288 2012).
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Conclusion
Given the integral globalisation of the marine fisheries’ capture and 
trade sector, and the fact that deficient IUU fishing control in the EEZ 
can have detrimental effects on communities inside as well as outside 
the coastal State, there is a need to develop mechanisms able to foster 
the accountability of the coastal State at the international, transnational 
and domestic levels. Although not completely absent and harbouring 
some complementarity and potential for further development, current 
mechanisms are insufficient.  International adjudication under the LOSC 
is largely inoperative in respect of coastal State sovereign rights and 
corresponding obligations in the EEZ. The supervisory and transparency 
mechanisms established by RFMOs tend to exclude non-transboundary 
EEZ stock, and existing international market mechanisms are not capable 
of providing accountability in respect of some important aspects of 
coastal State governance, such as the activities of foreign vessels in the 
EEZ as well as being less effective against larger fishing nations. While this 
could be counteracted with further reliance upon access agreements, 
there is evidence that States in areas where IUU fishing is chronic continue 
to deal with operators directly, to the inaction of the relevant flag States 
in almost complete opacity. Indirect mechanisms are tangential, and 
domestic remedies are also limited and acknowledged as needing 
support in the areas where IUU fishing is most common, namely less-
developed and fragile States. In line with the high profile that IUU fishing 
has acquired in recent years in international agendas, global governance 
frameworks for IUU fishing control are developing rapidly. However, 
coastal State accountability, whether direct or indirect, lags behind in the 
growing regulatory landscape. More efforts are needed on the part of 
governments, industry and civil society to ensure possible mechanisms are 
fully explored and, where possible, developed. 
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